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Abstract 
In the paper, we derive a symmetric MSE for the three-firm location game on the discrete strategy space. Rather than 
being uniformly distributed, the MSE for the game has a multimodal distribution. Our theory is more convincing to 
predict equilibria of three-firm location games in the real world or controlled experiments, where players face finitely 
many choices.
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1. Introduction
Location games are initially investigated by Hotelling (1929). He assumes that players (cus-
tomers and ﬁrms) are evenly distributed on a linear market. Each customer purchases one unit
goods from the nearest ﬁrm. Hence ﬁrms choose optimal locations to maximize their expected
proﬁts. For such games, the case of three ﬁrms receives special interest, since Lerner and
Singer (1937) show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists for the case. As for the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium (hereafter MSE) of the three-ﬁrm location game, a prominent work is done by
Shaked (1982). He present that, under the assumption of the continuous strategy space (i.e.
locations set is a real interval, thus location choices are inﬁnitely many), a symmetric MSE
exists, and the MSE has a uniform probability function with the support between the ﬁrst and
third quartile of the interval.
Yet the game of three ﬁrms with discrete location choices has never been examined theo-
retically. A naive conjecture is that the MSE of the game is (discretely) uniformly distributed
as well. Unfortunately it is not true. This is ﬁrstly noticed by Collins and Sherstyuk (2000).
In their experiment of three-ﬁrm location game, the observed data can be poorly calibrated
by a uniform distribution. Thus, a model capable of explaining the inconsistency between the
conventional wisdom and the newly established experiment, becomes vital.
Our purpose is to derive the mixed strategy equilibrium for the three-ﬁrm game on the dis-
crete strategy space. The condition of the discrete location set is justiﬁed by the fact that
players often face ﬁnitely many choices in location games observed in both the real world and
controlled experiments. Our result is striking. We show that, for the three-ﬁrm game on the
discrete strategy space, an MSE deﬁned between the ﬁrst and the third quartile on the interval
exists, but it is not uniformly distributed. Rather, the MSE has a multimodal probability distri-
bution, and its p.m.f is sensitive to the number of available locations. The MSE is distinct from
the notable result of Shaked (1982) for games on the continuous space, and it is more consistent
with experimental observation of Collins and Sherstyuk (2000).
The rest of the paper contributes to the computation of the MSE under the assumption of
discrete strategies confronted by players.
2. Computations of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
SupposeﬁrmschooselocationsfromadiscretelocationsetS:=f0; 1;:::; ngN. Withoutloss
of generality, we assume per location there is one customer with one unit demand. Consumers
purchase from the nearest ﬁrm(s) (if the number of the nearest ﬁrms is large than one, these
ﬁrms equally share the market).
Since the calculation requires numerical methods, we ﬁrst analyze simple games as n =
4; 8; 12; 16, then examine the game as n = 100 and compare the MSE with the experimental
result of Collins and Sherstyuk (2000).
2.1. Interval length n = 4; 8; 12; 16. The p.m.f is illustrated in the following ﬁgures. See
Appendix for the computation.
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FIGURE 2.1. MSE of three-ﬁrm location game on discrete location space: n =
4; 8; 12; 16
(A) n=4 (B) n=8
(C) n=12 (D) n=16
2.2. Interval length n = 100. For games of n = 100, p.m.f of the mixed strategy equilibrium
is depicted in the ﬁrst ﬁgure. To compare with the result of Collins and Sherstyuk (2000), the
second ﬁgure shows the p.m.f when location choices are grouped into 21 categories (with 3
locations in the ﬁrst and the last category, and 5 locations in every other category).
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FIGURE 2.2. MSE of three-ﬁrm location game on discrete location space: n = 100
















(B) n=100, grouped into 21 categories
(C) Empirical distribution of Collins and Sherstyuk (2000)
3. CONCLUSION
In the paper, we derive a symmetric MSE for the three-ﬁrm location game on the discrete
strategyspace. Ratherthanbeinguniformlydistributed, theMSEforthegamehasamultimodal
distribution. Our theory is more convincing to predict equilibria of three-ﬁrm location games in
the real world or controlled experiments such as Collins and Sherstyuk (2000), where players
face ﬁnitely many choices.
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APPENDIX
Inspired by Shaked (1982), we conjecture the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for three-
ﬁrm discrete location problem is deﬁned over points between the ﬁrst and the third quartile of
the interval, but without any presumptions imposed on the distribution form.




> > > <
> > > :
a x = f2; 6g
b x = f3; 5g
c x = f4g
0 otherwise
(1)
where 2a+2b+c = 1. The probability mass function is conjectured to be symmetric, with
positive value deﬁned over points between two middle quartiles, and zero value otherwise.
Therefore, the support of d(x) is Z = f2; 3; 4; 5; 6g and its complement is Z = f0; 1; 7; 8g.
For an equilibrium, payoff function of a ﬁrm - conditional on location choices with proba-
bility mass function of two other ﬁrms - should take a single value over support of d(x) and a
lower value outside the support.
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wherequo(x; y)andrem(x; y)arequotientandremainderofx=y. Bydeﬁnition, å
j
x=id(x)=
0 if j < i.
The ﬁrst and the second summations are payoffs when the other two ﬁrms sit to the left of z
at one or two locations respectively. The third summation represents payoff when one ﬁrm is
located at z and the other to the left of z. The fourth summation corresponds to the case of one
ﬁrm on each side of z. The ﬁfth and sixth summations echo to the cases the two ﬁrms standing
to the right of z at one or two locations respectively. The seventh summation evaluates payoff
when one ﬁrm is located at z and the other to the right of z. The last summation is payoff when
the other two ﬁrms standing at z as well.
For any point of the support Z, payoff takes a single value:
F(z j z 2 Z = f2; 3; 4; 5; 6g) = F (3)
where F is a constant.
Equations 1, 2 and 3 give:
a = 0:129; b = 0:280; c = 0:181; F = 3
To verify this is an mixed strategy equilibrium, we need to show the payoff outside the
support of d(x) has values lower than F.
Payoff for a ﬁrm situated at z 2 Z = f0; 1; 7; 8g is:


























































F(1) = F(7) = 2:619
Since F(z j z 2 f0; 1g) is increasing function and F(z j z 2 f7; 8g) is decreasing function
with respect to z, F(z j z 2 f0; 1; 7; 8g) < F.




> > > <
> > > :
0:129 x = f2; 6g
0:280 x = f3; 5g
0:181 x = f4g
0 otherwise
is one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for three- ﬁrm location problem when n = 8.





0:25 x = f1; 3g
0:5 x = f2g
0 otherwise
is one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for the location problem when n = 4,
d(x) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0:085 x = f3; 9g
0:207 x = f4; 8g
0:122 x = f5; 7g
0:172 x = f6g
0 otherwise
is one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for the location problem when n = 12, and
d(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
0:063 x = f4; 12g
0:163 x = f5; 11g
0:083 x = f6; 10g
0:137 x = f7; 9g
0:106 x = f8g
0 otherwise
is one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for the location problem when n = 16.
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